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Legitimacy in a Federal System  
William R. MacKayi 
Introduction 
 
Although federalism of various types has existed throughout history, ancient and 
medieval federations were, on the whole, short-lived.1  Most federations were non-
existent by the time of the enlightenment and the rise of nation-states.  So-called modern 
federalism stems from the American republic founded in 1787, which in many ways is 
the archetypal one, representing the creation of a federal government by compact among 
several previous constituent units – e pluribus unum.  The federalist structure is becoming 
increasingly popular as 90 percent of states today contain a plurality of national, ethnic or 
linguistic groups.2 Nevertheless, a normative theory of federalism has not been fully 
developed.3  Indeed, Wayne Norman notes that in the history of modern political 
philosophy, questions of federalism have generally attracted no more than a footnote or a 
chapter, although cursory discussion can be found in the writings of such luminaries as 
J.S. Mill, Bodin, Grotius, Montesquieu, Bentham, Constant and Sidgwick.4  Such a 
theory will aid in setting standards with which we can we assess, evaluate, justify, defend 
or attack the structure and operation of the federal system.  Although I do not attempt in 
this paper to elucidate a complete theory of federalism through a normative lens, I will 
attempt to demonstrate one of the primary means by which citizens in a federal state (in 
particular, Canada) evaluate the legitimacy of government action.   
 
Legitimacy as Consent 
 
a. Legitimacy Beyond the Rule of Law 
 
According to William Connolly5, Max Weber’s definition of legitimacy provides 
the starting point for any contemporary discussion of legitimacy.  Weber concludes there 
are three alternative claims to legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and legal.6 Legitimacy 
may reside in an appeal to tradition or the established belief in the sanctity of long-
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established traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them. 
Legitimacy may equally be founded on charisma.  This is the devotion to the exceptional 
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person and the “normative 
patterns of order revealed or ordained by him”7. Finally, a claim might appeal to rational 
procedures or a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to 
authority under such rules to issue commands.  In a liberal democracy, legitimacy of 
governmental action is judged primarily on legal terms.  At a minimum, legitimacy 
entails government action that is consistent with the rule of law.  The rule of law requires 
citizens to be subject to known legal rules and executive accountability to the legal 
authority.8  However, even among committed legal positivists, the normative forms of the 
modern legal order go beyond mere legislation.9  Legitimacy in the broader sense must 
demonstrate some form of consent to authority.  Central to this normative evaluation of 
law as consent is both a rights evaluation and a contractualist one.   
 
b. Legitimacy as Action Consistent with Legal Rights 
 
Rights theory is based on the belief that certain natural rights are inviolable.10  
The theory is premised on the belief that an immoral law is no law at all.11  In the modern 
sense, according to Hohfeld’s widely accepted definition, a right is a legal claim that can 
be asserted against others, including, where relevant, the prevailing governmental 
power.12  Rights holders may act as they choose within the scope of the right, regardless 
of the practical result.  Further, many liberal democratic states today have a written Bill 
of Rights which set out certain inviolable rights that cannot be infringed by government 
action.  Thus, even though laws are passed in accordance with the Diceyan13 conception 
of the rule of law, they cannot be valid if they breach fundamental rights outlined in a 
written Bill of Rights. 
 
c. Legitimacy as Action Consistent with Contract 
 
Contractual theory has its roots in Thomas Hobbes14 and Jean Jacques 
Rousseau15.  Locke expressed it as: 
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Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of 
this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his consent.  The only way 
whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the bonds of civil society is by 
agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and 
peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater 
security against any that are not of it.16    
 
Thus, according to contractual theory, government is a compact entered into by the 
people acting in their own self-interest for self-preservation.  As the people have freely 
consented to authority, consent is the primary means of determining the legitimacy of 
governmental action. The idea of consent was used as a legitimizing principle most 
recently by John Rawls.17  For Rawls, consensus around a liberal conception of justice is 
the only viable basis for a stable union in modern democratic societies, which are 
characterized by what he calls the “fact of pluralism”.  As citizens have, and will continue 
to have, competing comprehensive moral conceptions that involve different convictions 
about what makes life valuable, and what moral theories ground such beliefs, a common 
consensus must be reached for liberal democracy to remain viable.   
 
Like Max Weber, Rawls saw three possible bases of social union (or basis of 
consent to authority).  First, there could be universal acceptance of some particular 
comprehensive moral doctrine.  Rawls sees this as unrealistic given the pluralistic nature 
of the modern liberal democratic state.  Second is self-interest.  Like Hobbes, Rawls saw 
a possible basis of legitimacy to be a pragmatic one in which citizens submit to authority 
and social union on the basis of need.  However, Rawls rejects this as too temporary in 
nature.  Once the conditions that brought on the consent shift, the legitimacy of the 
authority will be questioned.  The third basis of consent Rawls recognizes is the 
overlapping consensus around a political conception of justice.  This will be a narrow 
enough conception of the good to ensure the long-term viability of the legitimacy of 
authority and is less prone to desertion when it is to one party’s advantage. 
 
Consent in a Federal System 
 
d. Justifications for Federalism 
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Richard Simeon lists the justifications for federal governance as: effectiveness, 
community, and democracy.18  Effectiveness justifies an action by a constituent or 
national level of government where it will enhance the capacity of government 
institutions to generate effective policy and respond to citizen needs.  The principle of 
community justifies the exercise of authority from the level of government that best 
represents the community affected. Moreover, it will appeal to the image of the ideal or 
preferred community that that constituency represents.  Finally, the democracy 
justification is used to attempt to legitimize federal or provincial actions by 
demonstrating that the exercise of power by that level of government promotes 
democracy.  A national government will appeal to majority support in the nation-state as 
a whole to justify its authority.  A state or provincial government, on the other hand, will 
try to demonstrate that its legitimacy to oppose national authority is based on a majority 
within its borders opposed to the imposition of federal authority and maintain that federal 
action is an illegitimate use of federal power because it will be a manifestation of the 
tyranny of the majority federalism is intended to prevent.19 
 
e. Federal Sub-Units as Political Communities 
 
In a federal system, authority will only be considered legitimate if citizens accept 
it on the basis of both a traditional appeal to legitimacy and a corollary federal value.  
The justification I will be focusing on is community, which is particularly relevant to the 
Canadian federal system.20  The legitimacy of federal action is therefore assessed in its 
ability to successfully maintain a balance between the provincial and national 
communities.   
 
This is a broader conception than nationalism.  Essentially, our community 
determines who we are; it is the context in which we exist and which gives meaning to 
our actions. 21  Communitarian arguments reject the idea that individuals are an 
aggregation of identifiable preferences that exist prior to, or apart from, any group.  
Instead, citizens form preferences with reference to that community as well as by 
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traditional modes of political action.   Political philosophers from Aristotle to 
Montesquieu insisted that political units had to stay relatively small, because only a small 
polity could possess sufficient social and moral commonality to be self-governing.22  This 
is a common reason for adopting a federal system.  Although James Madison argued that 
a large national government could more effectively control the tendency toward faction in 
popular governments23, he also insisted that the jurisdiction of the central government be 
limited, with states and localities retaining control over matters within their traditional 
authority.24  Madison assumed that a large and diverse nation could not offer the same 
sense of moral community as a small and relatively homogeneous republic.25 
 
In Canada, provinces are for the most part what have been called political 
communities. These have aspects of affective communities, which consist of mutual 
attachments through personal contact and day-to-day relationships.26  Further, they are 
also dialogic communities, which emphasize the instrumental role of public debate and 
uncoerced persuasion in arriving at collective decision-making (i.e. legitimate decision 
making).27 
 
These values are particularly connected in federations based on national 
cleavages.  However, the values may also be based on traditional ways of life or 
economic structure that create differences among otherwise homogenous federal states.  
For example, the American Civil War was largely fought to bring the southern states back 
into the union.  The Confederacy saw secession as the only means to preserve its 
traditional plantation economy in the face of a federal government seemingly dedicated to 
destroying its economic base.  Similarly, the imposition of the federal National Energy 
Policy in Canada by the federal government was seen as an attack by the provincial 
political community on the traditional resource economy of Alberta and thereby viewed 
as illegitimate despite its constitutional validity.   
 
Specifically, both of these federal actions were viewed by the citizens of the 
respective state and provincial governments as a breach of the self-determination inherent 
in the federal value of community.  Both situations were an affront to what the people 
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thought was the federal principle that allows the government closest to them to make 
decisions about particular local issues.  In these cases, the resource economy and the 
cotton economy were deemed to be essential to the communities and particular to the 
region.  As such, the citizens believed the only legitimate use of power was by the 
constituent government itself, or at least with their consultation. 
 
Thus, democratic claims to legitimacy in a federal system are often linked to 
similar traditional legal claims to legitimacy. This legitimacy depends on using 
mechanisms which are consistent both with federal democratic values, in that they are 
constitutionally valid and, in a broader sense, are not a manifestation of the tyranny of the 
majority over a discrete political community.  As a final example, I would point to the 
imposition of the Charter of Rights in Canada. Legally, the federal government was in a 
position to patriate the new Constitution Act, 198228 (which included the Charter of 
Rights) absent any provincial consent.29  The Charter was eventually adopted with the 
approval of all provinces except Quebec.  Indeed, to this day all laws passed in Quebec 
are passed “notwithstanding”30 the provisions of the Charter in protest of this federal use 
of authority.   
 
However, it could not be said that the people of Quebec did not accept the 
principles of the Charter. Nor do Quebeckers see the imposition of the Charter as illegal.  
Nevertheless, the Charter is deemed illegitimate by Quebeckers because it is perceived to 
have been imposed by the federal government on the people of Quebec in spite of the 
opposition of the provincial government, an illegitimate use of authority because it is a 
breach of the federalist goal of protecting political communities. 31 
 
A federal system is one of dual sovereignty.  Both the federal and regional 
governments are sovereign in its sphere of governance and should be independent of one 
another.32  Thus, at its core, the federal system can be understood as the integration of 
political communities that share a common population.  The legitimacy of federal action 
is therefore assessed by its ability to successfully maintain a balance between the 
provincial and national communities.  Thomas Franck made a similar determination: 33 
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While most literature about the social contract addresses the formation of a 
community by persons, contractarian theory is also readily applicable to, and 
influential in, the evolution of a community of states. 
 
Franck demonstrates the community’s impact on citizens’ understanding of legitimacy 
with this remark:34 
 
It is only by reference to a community’s evolving standards of what constitutes 
right process that it is possible to assert meaningfully that a law, or an executive 
order, or a court’s judgment, or a citizen’s claim on a compatriot, or a 
government’s claim on a citizen is legitimate.   
 
f. The Rights of Political Communities 
 
In federalist theory, particularly in the United States, the partial independence of 
the two levels of government is usually defined in terms of rights.  The point is to allow 
normative disagreement amongst the subordinate units so that different units can 
subscribe to different value systems.35 In a similar manner to citizens, sub-units in a 
federal state may act as they choose within the scope of the right, regardless of the 
practical result.  When the larger nation state acts within the scope of the sub-unit’s rights 
to obtain the results it desires, that right is abrogated.  The constitution defines and guards 
the rights of the sub-units with an arbiter designated as the ultimate determiner of 
whether rights were violated.  For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft36 Madam Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the majority, stated in reviewing legislation the Court was required 
to declare legislation ultra vires where the division of powers in the Constitution 
compelled it to do so even if “one could prove that federalism secured no advantages to 
anyone.”37    
 
g. The Federal Contract 
 
Contractual theory forms the basis of much of the current understanding of 
federalist relations. The federal framework is recognized as having the nature of a state 
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system safeguarded by an effective coercive apparatus such as the federal Constitution.  It 
is rigorously understood as a contract, generating the members’ consensus as the base of 
the system.38   The American Senator John C. Calhoon stated:39 
 
…the present constitution is the act of States themselves, which is the same thing as the people of 
the several States, and forms a union of them as sovereign communities…the confederation was a 
contract between agents-the present Constitution a contract between the principals themselves. 
 
Similarly, Kant in Perpetual Peace (1795)40 envisioned a pact between nations binding 
each and every one of them to certain rules in order to overcome the defects generated by 
state sovereignty.  According to Kant, nations make war because they find themselves in 
a state of nature and the transition to political society, which worked for people within 
individual countries, must be extended to nations. Finally, Wayne Norman uses this 
approach as well and recommends that federal principles and institutions be judged as if 
they were selected by enlightened federal partners interested in developing a stable, 
mutually beneficial federation in the long-term.  Norman’s theory, like modern 
contractual theories applying to unitary states and their citizens, maintains that it is 
irrelevant in the first instance whether there actually was a contract but when evaluating 
the institutions we must look at historical pacts, treaties and traditions.  The task, 
according to Norman, is to sketch the basic normative structure starting from the situation 
of independent nations negotiating to form a just and stable federation. Applying such a 
general theory to an actual federation will involve balancing its recommendations with 
the moral force of historical arguments. 41   
 
The consensus can be built, at a minimum, on what is an unjust federation.  
Norman includes in this: the perception by the citizens of any sub-unit that it is unfairly 
disadvantaged in the federation or that it is underrepresented in key federal institutions; 
mutual lack of understanding among citizens and political elites of different regions or 
provinces of each others’ political, economic, or cultural situation; divergent perceptions 
of the history or prehistory of the federation; mutual distrust concerning the use of federal 
institutions; resentment by one minority represented as a majority in a sub-unit 
concerning the treatment of its people.42 
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The way to avoid the perception of an unjust federation is to base it on the normative 
quality of trust.43 According to Daniel Weinstock, the central government can encourage 
trust among the members and representatives of groups assembled within the same 
society at the national level. Citizens of sub-units must not perceive that the federal 
government is posing threats to the interests that distinguish them from the nation as a 
whole. Through the federalist system, groups will generate a common political identity 
that will foster the achievement of social values and goals traditionally identified with 
societies that have a strong common national identity.   
 
Conclusion 
   
Essentially, the subject of a federal state is what David Held calls the 
“cosmopolitan” citizen.44  Held, posits that the citizen in the modern liberal-democratic 
state has several allegiances to various actors.  Included in this, I would submit, is the 
sub-unit the citizen happens to live in.  This is particularly the case in some provinces of 
Canada.  There is a national community (those who hold primary allegiance to the 
Canadian state) and separate provincial communities (those who hold primary allegiance 
to their province).  However, the degree of bifurcation varies from province to province.  
Nevertheless, in Canada, all provinces have significant provincial communities except 
Ontario.45 
 
It is my assertion that the cosmopolitan citizen has always existed in federal states 
with allegiances to the federal or constituent government fluctuating based on his or her 
understanding of the value of federalism generally and the specific federal values of his 
or her broader nation-state.  Accordingly, government action in a federal state will only 
be legitimate if it successfully appeals to two notions.  First, citizens must accept 
government authority on the basis of traditional Weberian notions of legal legitimacy.  In 
a federal state this means that the action must be consistent with the government’s 
constitutionally defined rights.  Second, authority must be legitimate in that it does not 
undermine the political communities fostered by federalism. 
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Therefore, at a minimum, legitimacy of governmental action in a federal system 
must be consistent with the federal contract.  The contract is based on the mutual consent 
of the constituent units to legislative or executive action by the federal government.  This 
consent will be determined primarily by a contractual interpretation of the historic 
reading of the federal constitution.  However, where the legal interpretation is unclear, 
the political communities within the federal system must not have a sense that action is 
being imposed on them illegitimately, in that it is without their consent.  Where this 
occurs, the trust in the federation of the constituent political community will be 
undermined and the long-term viability of the federation compromised.   
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